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8.1  Introduction 
The last four years have been the most tumultuous period  in  the 
postwar history of the Philippines. In August  1983, Benign0 Aquino, 
a popular opposition figure, was assassinated on his return from exile 
in the United States. That October, the Philippines declared the first 
of what was to be a series of 90-day moratoriums on principal repay- 
ments on its external debt. The rescheduling negotiations were difficult, 
and it was not until May  1985 that an agreement was signed with the 
country’s private creditors. 
In the interim the Philippines carried out a stringent IMF adjustment 
program which eliminated the current account deficit and restored the 
rate of  inflation  to near zero. But the output cost was  substantial; 
between 1983 and 1986 real per capita income fell by  18 percent. In 
some sections of the country, particularly  the sugar growing area of 
Negros, there was widespread  malnutrition.  The growing economic 
plight, along with  rising middle class and business opposition to the 
government, contributed to the February 1986 overthrow of Ferdinand 
Marcos, a ruler  who had  been  entrenched in  the Philippines  for 20 
years. 
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The fledgling democracy led by Corazon Aquino, the wife of the slain 
opposition  leader, started with  much  goodwill,  but  severe economic 
problems, including a debt service burden amounting to almost half of 
exports. The Philippines, the sole Asian country to declare a mora- 
torium, is often overlooked in discussions of the current less developed 
country (LDC) debt crisis. Also overlooked is the fact that the country 
was once widely viewed  as one of the successor generation of East 
Asian tigers. What is remarkable in retrospect is not the debt buildup 
that took place, nor the fact that the Philippines  had to reschedule. 
Rather it is that what appeared to be rapid economic growth and struc- 
tural transformation  could unravel  so quickly during the 1980s, even 
before the Aquino assassination, the cutoff  of  external funding, and 
the adjustment program. Although foreign borrowing pumped the econ- 
omy up, it failed to establish self-sustaining growth. At the same time, 
the excesses of the Marcos government weakened the private business 
sector, leaving the country vulnerable to the shocks of the 1980s. 
8.2  Debt Buildup 
Ironically,  the Philippines  began  the  1970s with  debt rescheduling 
and an IMF-sponsored stabilization program, the product of fiscal ex- 
pansion and short-term borrowing during Marcos’s first administration. 
The early  1970s was a period of economic recovery,  aided by rising 
world commodity prices. But the political environment deteriorated at 
the same time, with increasing protests, kidnappings, and other vio- 
lence. To restore order, and to prolong his own hold on office beyond 
the constitutional limit, Marcos declared martial law in September 1972. 
Although security threats, some real and some faked, provided the 
rationale for declaring martial law, the justification for maintaining  it 
quickly became  the promise of higher  economic growth and greater 
equality. Marcos initiated a series of reforms, including land reform, 
and launched a greatly expanded public development investment pro- 
gram. Between 1972 and 1976 public-sector fixed investment rose from 
2 percent of GNP  to 6.5 percent of GNP. Private investment also grew 
in  this period, as total gross domestic capital formation rose from 22 
to 31 percent of GNP (see table 8.1). 
Although the oil price shock of 1974 and the subsequent fall in world 
commodity prices  hit  the  Philippines  severely,  policymakers  main- 
tained their investment strategy. There was ready external financing. 
The United  States supported the Marcos government, and aid flows 
increased sharply  after martial  law.  The country also began  to tap 
multilateral lending sources, and funds were available from commercial 
banks. For the remainder of the decade the Philippines maintained a 
domestic growth rate of 6.5 percent  per year, and a current account 
deficit of about 5 percent of GNP. Table 8.1  Philippine Macroeconomic Indicators (percentage of GNP) 
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Real GNP (% change) 










MI (% change) 
Inflation rate (CPI) 
5.4  9.3  5.6  5.8  7.4  6.3  5.8  6.9  5.0  3.4  1.9  1.1  -6.8  -3.8  1.5 
21.6  21.9  26.7  30.6  31.3  29.0  29.1  31.0  30.7  30.7  28.8  27.5  19.2  16.3  14.0 
2.1  2.3  3.4  4.3  6.6  6.9  7.2  7.3  6.9  8.0  7.2  6.1  4.1  3.7  n.a. 
14.4  14.3  11.7  16.0  15.2  14.9  14.8  13.7  14.4  15.8  15.7  14.0  12.7  13.5  17.8 
12.5  13.2  12.2  14.7  13.5  13.0  13.6  13.5  13.1  11.8  11.4  12.0  10.8  11.6  13.1 
-2.0  -1.2  0.5  -1.2  -1.8  -1.9  -  1.2  -0.2  -  1.3  -4.0  -4.3  -2.0  -  1.9  -  1.9  -4.7 
0.1  5.0  -1.2  -5.6  -5.8  -3.6  -4.6  -5.1  -5.4  -5.4  -8.1  -8.1  -3.5  -0.2  3.3 
24.9  12.3  24.0  14.5  17.1  23.7  13.4  11.2  19.6  4.4  -0.1  38.3  3.5  6.5  19.2 
16.6  16.5  34.2  6.8  9.2  9.9  7.3  16.5  17.6  12.4  10.4  10.0  50.3  24.9  0.7 
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With the rise in the current account deficit the country’s foreign debt 
grew rapidly,  nearly tripling between 1974 and  1978 (table 8.2).  The 
public sector did most of the borrowing, and held over 70 percent of 
the foreign debt of the nonbanking  sector by the end of the decade. 
The Philippines borrowed increasingly from banks, and in the form of 
loans with floating interest rates. But this was true of all LDC borrowers 
during the 1970s, and the shifts towards commercial terms and floating 
rates were less pronounced in the Philippines than in most borrowers. 
The country’s policymakers  managed  the debt carefully  during the 
1970s, lengthening maturities, and refinancing when better terms were 
available. As a result, the debt service ratio (interest and amortization 
payments as a percentage of exports) increased only slightly, reaching 
21 percent by  1980. 
In a shift of  policy from that of previous postwar governments, the 
Marcos administration actively encouraged foreign direct investment. 
But even though direct investment inflows increased sharply after 1972, 
they  played  a  minor  role  in  total  external finance,  averaging  only 
8.6 percent of external borrowing during the 1970s. 
In  the other direction, capital  outflow  by  Philippine  residents, or 
capital flight, has long been a feature of the economy. A comparison 
of the total inflow of funds with the financing needs for the current 
account deficit and reserve accumulation indicates an outflow of about 
$3.6 billion from 1971 to 1980, or roughly one-third of  the increase in 
total external indebtedness.  Capital flight in the Philippines was not 
nearly so large as in Argentina or Mexico, but was much larger than 
in Korea or Brazil. Thus foreign direct investment did not add appre- 
ciably  to the inflow of capital, while capital flight was a substantial 
drain. 
Still, at the end of the 1970s the Philippines was hardly a problem 
debtor. The country had significantly increased its external indebted- 
ness, but had also raised its export and GNP  growth rates. At the end 
of  1979, the Philippines  had a debt/GNP ratio comparable to that of 
Korea. Its debt service ratio was higher, but was well below that of 
most Latin American borrowers. 
The Philippine economic situation deteriorated rapidly after the sec- 
ond oil price shock in 1980. The government tried to counter the grow- 
ing  domestic  recession  by  raising  expenditure,  and  announced an 
ambitious program of energy and industrial investment. As a result, 
the  public  sector deficit  rose  sharply,  from  2  percent  of  GNP to 
5.5 percent, and the current account deficit widened to 8 percent of 
GNP (table 8.1, and table 8.5 below). 
In contrast to neighboring countries, and to its own experience after 
the first oil shock, the Philippine economy did not recover under the 
impetus of increased investment spending. Growth rates dropped each 
year after 1979 (table 8.1, and table 8.10 below). The dollar value of Table 8.2  Philippine External Debt (millions of US $) 
1970  1974  1978  1980  1982  1983  1984 
Total external debt  2,297  3,755  10,694  17,252  24,677  24,816  25,418 
Nonmonetary debt  2,088  2,726  8,189  12,318  17,601  19,468  20,211 
Medium- and long-term  1,779  2,395  6,932  9,770  13,141  15,412  15,926 
Short-term  309  331  1,257  2,548  4,460  4,056  4,285 
Monetary sector debt  159  1,029  2,505  4,934  7,076  5,348  5,207 
Memorandum items 
DebtlGNP (percent)  33.2  25.5  44.5  49.0  62.8  72.7  80.6 
Debt/exports goods, services  I74  106  218  215  308  305  317 
Debt service ratio total external debta  29.2  14.6  20.1  20.8  38.1  38.2  43.5 
Short-term as % of total external debt  22.6  36.2  35.2  43.4  46.7  37.9  37.3 
1985  1986 
26,252  28,186 
21,270  25,598 
17,679  22,808 
3,591  2,790 
4,982  2,588 
82.2  95.2 
332  32.8 
33b  33b 
32.7  19.1 
Sources: Philippine Central Bank, Management of External Debt and Investment Accounts Department (MEDIAD), and Central Bank, 
Financial Plan Data Center. Unpublished data. 
"Total interest payments plus amortization of  medium- and long-term debt as percentage of exports of goods and services. 
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Philippine exports hit a peak in  1980, and then fell at an average rate 
of almost 5 percent per year through 1983, the result not only of weak 
international prices, but also falling commodity export volumes.2 Slower 
domestic growth and higher world real interest rates severely affected 
major  domestic firms,  many  of  them highly  leveraged.  A  domestic 
financial crisis in 1981 brought about the failure of several large firms, 
many of which were bailed out by the government. Industrial failures 
continued to proliferate,  leaving the Philippine government, and par- 
ticularly the two major state banks, with nonperforming assets with a 
book value in the billions of dollars. 
Philippine  external borrowing  accelerated in  the early  1980s, and 
total foreign debt nearly doubled between  1979 and 1982. Borrowing 
increased under the pressure of a swollen current account deficit, but 
capital  flight  also accelerated sharply  in  the early  1980s,  averaging 
4.8 percent of GNP in  1981  and 1982. Net foreign direct investment 
inflows slowed to a trickle, as growing disinvestment offset direct in- 
vestment inflows. 
The cautious borrowing policy of the 1970s disappeared in the early 
1980s. The most abrupt change was the increasing use of short-term 
borrowing. This was particularly true of the public sector, which ac- 
counted for two-thirds of the increase in short-term debt outside the 
monetary ~ector.~  Much of  the increased  borrowing  was also done 
through the monetary sector. The Central Bank borrowed heavily be- 
tween 1980 and 1982, and encouraged banks to do so by providing swap 
 arrangement^.^ Despite its borrowing,  Central Bank reserves fell by 
$2 billion (two-thirds) from the end of  1980 to mid-1983.5 As a result, 
the monetary sector went from a net external asset position at the end 
of  1979, to a  $2.7 billion  net liability position by  1982. By  1982 the 
share of short-term debt, including monetary sector debt, in total debt 
rose to 47 percent, a much higher  share than in other LDC debtors. 
The Philippines first considered declaring a moratorium in late 1982. 
When it finally did so in October 1983, its foreign exchange reserves 
were nearly exhausted. 
8.3  The Role of  External Shocks 
The Philippines’s  real income position, and its ability to sustain its 
level  of foreign indebtedness, were diminished by  the two oil price 
shocks and the accompanying industrial country recessions. The com- 
modity price increases of 1973 and 1974 temporarily raised Philippine 
incomes,  but  between  1972  and  1976  the  terms  of  trade  fell  by 
22 percent, equivalent to an income loss of 4.3 percent of GNP.6 
The second oil price shock period, 1979 to 1982, had a much more 
severe effect. The income loss from the change in the terms of trade 175  Debt Crisis and Adjustment in the Philippines 
was larger, equivalent to 6.9 percent of GNP. This time, the terms of 
trade deterioration was coupled  with a rise  in real interest  rates of 
almost 12 percentage points, adding another 3.5 percent of GNP to the 
income loss.’ Thus the external shock totaled about 10 percent of GNP, 
which was among the largest for major LDC debtors. 
The Philippines faced an additional external problem not shared by 
other debtors. The terms of trade deterioration was not just a product 
of the two shock periods, but was more secular in nature.  Between 
1967 and 1979 (the predebt shock peak), Philippine terms of trade fell 
by 35 percent. The deterioration was quite steady, interrupted only in 
1973-74,  and 1977-79;  even at the 1974 commodity price peak, Phil- 
ippine terms of trade were below their 1970 level. It is of course difficult 
to say what  was  anticipated  and what  was unexpected about these 
movements in the terms of trade, but the required adjustments for the 
Philippine economy were large. 
8.4  Philippine Policy and the Debt Crisis 
The Philippines was hit more severely by external shocks than most 
debtor countries. Yet at the same time, the debt crisis that occurred in 
the Philippines was not simply a result of the second oil price shock 
and the rise in world real interest rates. The Philippines had developed 
a borrowing momentum that could not be sustained, and the country 
would have eventually come to an external crisis even if the shocks of 
the 1980s had not been there to hurry the process along. 
There were two fundamental economic difficulties. First, the Phil- 
ippines failed to develop self-sustaining growth that would have eased 
the burden of servicing its external debt. Second, the country failed to 
shift resources towards the traded goods sector, as was required both 
by its increasing debt burden and by  its declining terms of  trade. In 
more  concrete terms, the problems  were poor  returns  from invest- 
ments, difficulties in mobilizing domestic resources to fund investment, 
and the maintenance  of  a trade regime that  did not  sufficiently en- 
courage exports. In addition, the Marcos government created a political- 
economic environment that discouraged independent investment, led 
to capital flight, and eventually crippled much of the productive economy. 
8.4.1  Investment 
The post-1974 period in  the Philippines has been described as one 
of “debt-driven” growth. Indeed, the economy depended on expanding 
investment to generate Keynesian output growth. Of the total incre- 
ment in  GDP in  the rapid growth period  1974-79,  42  percent came 
from increased investment expenditure, 28 percent from construction 
expenditure  alone.* Despite  the  rapid  rise  in  investment,  and  the 176  Robert S. Dohner/Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
apparently high  levels of capital formation, the Philippines  was not 
successful in translating these additions to the capital stock into eco- 
nomic gr~wth.~  In comparison to neighboring countries, the Philippines 
invested more to grow less, and as table 8.3 indicates, this was par- 
ticularly true during the martial law period. The situation had become 
much worse by the early 1980s; between 1980 and 1983 the share of 
investment in GDP averaged over 29  percent, but GDP grew by only 
2.6 percent per year. 
There is no single explanation for the low return on investment ex- 
penditures. In part this was due to a shift towards infrastructure in- 
vestments with longer gestation and payout periods. The expansion of 
investment had a particularly large construction component, much of 
it in public  or quasi-public facilities:  luxury hotels, cultural centers, 
and some of the notorious projects of Imelda Marcos such as the villa 
built entirely of coconut products or the University of Life. 
Other investments were hurt by changes in world demand and prices. 
These include major investments in copper refining, sugar mills, and 
arguably, the nuclear power plant that the Philippines built. 
But more fundamental causes were involved. In the latter half of the 
1970s, investment and output growth shifted towards capital-intensive 
industries, particularly  intermediate goods, industries which by defi- 
nition required large investments per unit of output. This shift was the 
result  of  the high  degree  of  tariff  protection given  to the domestic 
manufacturing industry coupled with the rapid growth of construction 
and other investment expenditures. Capital-intensive industries,  and 
capital-intensive  methods within industries, were encouraged by  an 
industrial incentive system that greatly cheapened capital, by low real 
interest rates in the 1970s, and by credit rationing that channeled low 
Table 8.3  Comparative Investment/Growth Rates 
Investment  Ratea  GDP Growth Rate  Ratio (ICORb) 
1967-72  1974-80  1967-72  1974-80  1967-72  1974-80 
Philippines  20.5  29.5  5.27  6.46  3.88  4.57 
Malaysia  18.2  25.8  n.a.  7.26  n.a.  3.55 
Indonesia  12.8  20.0  8.20  7.42  1.56  2.70 
Thailand  24.3  26.1  6.46  7.48  3.77  3.48 
Korea  25.2  29.8  10.0  7.67  2.53  3.89 
Sources: Philippines: National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), The na- 
tional income accounts CY  1946-75,  National income series no. 5 (Manila: NEDA, 1978); 
and Philippine statisticul yearbook 1987. Others: IMF International Financial Statistics. 
'Gross  domestic capital formation as percentage of GDP. 
bIncremental capital-output ratio. 
n.a. = not available. 177  Debt Crisis and Adjustment in the Philippines 
cost funds to approved investments. The rapid growth of these indus- 
tries was responsible for much of the low output response and low 
employment generation of investment in the Philippines, and for the 
apparent fall in  manufacturing productivity  over the decade.10 And, 
limited by  their high  cost  to the  domestic market, these industries 
suffered when the investment and construction boom faded in the 1980s. 
Favoritism in allocation of loans and government projects and profit 
skimming on imported capital equipment also reduced the profitability 
of investment. The Philippines paid more for imported capital equip- 
ment than other LDCs, and stones of  kickbacks paid by  equipment 
suppliers have begun to emerge."  In many of these projects the returns 
were made simply by the project going forward, and not by the prof- 
itable operation of  the resulting installation. 
The investments made in  the 1970s proved particularly vulnerable 
to the economic slowdown and higher interest rates of the 1980s. Many 
of the investments ended up in receivership, in  the hands of the two 
state banks and the National Development  Company. These nonper- 
forming assets, and their accompanying debt service obligations, form 
the most difficult fiscal problem the new government faces. 
8.4.2  Resource Mobilization 
The second weakness of Philippine economic policy was the contin- 
ued dependence on foreign borrowing to fund domestic investment. To 
maintain economic growth in the face of external recession, the Phil- 
ippines  increased government expenditure  and borrowed  abroad  in 
1975. But the current account deficit never narrowed, and was  still 
about 5 percent of GNP in  1979. By  1982, after the second oil shock, 
the deficit had risen to over 8 percent of GNP. The current account 
has  both  a  macroeconomic  side,  and  a  microeconomic/resource- 
allocation side. We  discuss the first here, the inability to generate suf- 
ficient domestic resources to fund the higher level of investment. 
Table 8.4 breaks down investment and savings into public and private 
components. Private savings rose briefly during the mid-1970s as the 
economic growth  rate accelerated, but trailed  off  by the end of  the 
decade, leaving a private-sector gap of about 2 percent of GNP. 
Public-sector revenue generation might have had the most promise, 
since the level of taxation in the Philippines has historically been very 
low in comparison to other LDCs. And, shortly after martial law was 
declared, there was a significant increase in the national government's 
revenue share of  GNP, due to increased tax  compliance, as well as 
premium  duties levied on international  trade.  However, despite re- 
peated commitments to raise government revenue, and a series of an- 
nual tax measures, the revenue share remained about  13 percent for 
the rest of the decade.12  The Philippines ran hard just to stay in place. 178  Robert S. Dohner/Ponciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 8.4  Savings/Investment Balances (percentage of GNP) 
1976  1978  1980  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Private sector 
Investment  24.73  21.88 
Savings  23.56  20.77 
Personal  10.88  8.44 
Corporate"  3.09  2.87 
Depreciationb  9.59  9.47 
Surplus (deficit)  -1.17  -1.12 
Public sector 
Investment  6.56  7.20 
Savings  1.82  3.93 
Net foreign resources/  5.90  4.31 
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-  0.33 
-  1.05 
Source: Philippines, NEDA, National Accounts  section. 
"Includes saving by government-owned corporations. 
bIncludes statistical discrepancy. 
The country depended heavily on indirect  taxes and taxes on inter- 
national trade, taxes which had low elasticity. Some of  the rise in the 
revenue share had been transitory, particularly additional export taxes 
levied on windfall prices that disappeared after 1975. Finally, the gov- 
ernment eroded the corporate tax base during the decade by granting 
a large number of incentives and exemptions. The Marcos government, 
which needed to solidify its position by granting tax exemptions, was 
not strong enough politically to increase overall tax rates and collections. 
The domestic recession lowered the government's tax collections in 
the early 1980s. In addition, changes in the way taxes were calculated 
reduced income tax collections, as did increasing evasion. As a result, 
the share of national government revenue in GNP fell by  2 percent 
between 1979 and 1982. This occurred at the same time that the national 
government and publicly owned corporations increased their invest- 
ment to offset the recession, and the consolidated public-sector deficit 
rose  sharply to over 5  percent  of  GNP by  1982 (table 8.5). Private 
savings slumped in  1982, the product of falling per capita income and 
expectations of  a future exchange rate depreciation. So in  spite of a 
fall in private-sector investment, the resource gap of the private sector 
also increased. 
8.4.3 
As described above, the two oil price shocks were dramatic episodes 
in what has been a pronounced secular deterioration in the Philippine 
terms of trade. At the same time, the debt service obligations of  the 
Philippines steadily  rose  as a result  of  the  increased use of foreign 
Trade Policy and Exchange Regime 179  Debt Crisis and Adjustment in the Philippines 
Table 8.5  Public-Sector Balances (percentage of  GNP) 
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1  .5b 
O.Ob 
1  .9b 
0.9b 
n.a. 
-  3.7 
"After transfers from the national government. 
hFigures for  1986 refer to 14 major nonfinancial government  corporations. 
n.a.  = not available. 
capital. Both of these required a shift in Philippine productive resources 
towards traded goods industries. This did not occur during the period 
leading up to the debt crisis. Despite the rapid growth in nontraditional 
manufactures exports, and the transformation in the Philippine export 
mix, the share of exports in total output increased only modestly and 
arguably fell on a net basis. 
Relative price movements signal resource shifts, and table 8.6 pre- 
sents several measures relevant to the traded goods sector in the Phil- 
ippines. Despite some variation, the price measures tell much the same 
story. The real depreciation that took place during the 1970 stabilization 
program was sustained until the middle of the decade. After that point 
there was a gradual but persistent fall in the relative price of tradable 
goods and a decline in Philippine export competitiveness. This is most 
clearly seen in the relative price of tradable to nontradable goods, which 
declined by about 9 percent from its level at the beginning of the decade. 
The real exchange rate (Philippine prices relative to those of its trading 
partners) varies over a wider range, but shows a decline from the mid- 
1970s.'3 The one competitiveness  measure  that  shows  a  continued 
improvement is the real wage rate, which was an important factor in 180  Robert S. DohnedPonciano Intal, Jr. 
Table 8.6  Philippines Relative Price Indexes 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
PNonTraded  REER  Trade  PGDP  Real Wage 

























































































































I.  Traded goods prices are a weighted average of gross value-added (GVA) deflators for 
agriculture and forestry, mining,  and  tradable manufactures.  Nontraded prices are a 
weighted average of  GVA deflators for construction, electricity and gas, and services. 
Weights are 1972 value addeds. 
2.  Dollar wholesale prices in major Philippine markets divided by dollar prices in the 
Philippines. Markets are the United States,  Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, and Korea. 
An increase in the index is a real depreciation. 
3. Export unit value divided by import unit value. 
4. GVA deflators from national accounts. 
5. Basic manufacturing wage divided by GDP deflator. Wage series discontinued in 1981. 
ma.  = not available. 
the growth of  manufactures exports from the Philippines during the 
decade. 
Philippine trade and industrial performance have been determined 
by a system of  protection initiated in  1950. To  deal with external im- 
balance, the Philippine government began licensing imports, in amounts 
determined by essentiality of  the product. The incentives created for 
domestic production of these goods led to rapid industrialization and 
growth during much of  the decade, but the growth rate had slowed 
appreciably by 1959. 181  Debt Crisis and Adjustment in the Philippines 
The Philippines carried out a liberalization program in 1960-62,  de- 
preciating the exchange rate and removing import controls. However 
the intention was never to alter the protective system, and tariffs were 
raised  to counteract the effect of ending import licensing.  The liber- 
alization did not succeed in producing more rapid growth, nor in de- 
veloping  manufactures  exports.  Modest  import  controls  were 
reintroduced at the end of the 1960s as the balance of payments wors- 
ened, and were extended further during the 1970s. 
The disappointing economic performance of the 1960s blunted the 
challenge to the structure of import protection. Policy turned toward 
industrial promotion through incentives legislation (1967) and narrow 
export promotion  through  investment incentives  and duty free im- 
ported inputs (1970.) As a result, three streams of trade policy devel- 
oped in the 1970s. First, import-substituting  manufacturing continued 
to have heavy tariff protection. This was supplemented with non-tariff 
barriers and industrial incentives in the latter part of the decade. 
Second, manufactures exports, especially  apparel, footwear, and 
electronic components, grew rapidly in the 1970s under the impetus of 
the  1970 depreciation, falling  real  wages, and  duty free imports of 
materials. However no provision was made to compensate exporters 
for the high cost of domestic procurement. As a result almost all inputs 
were imported, margins of domestic value added were very thin, and 
export growth was heavily dependent on export processing zones and 
bonded warehouses. 
Third, the Philippines increased the taxation of traditional  export 
commodities, particularly agricultural commodities. Temporary export 
taxes were introduced  after the devaluation  in  1970, but were later 
made permanent, and supplemented with windfall duties in  1974. The 
two most important export crops, coconuts and sugar, were monop- 
olized under government sanction, and a substantial levy was placed 
on coconut (copra) producers.I4  As a result of the increasing effective 
taxation, traditional exports stagnated during the 1970s and then fell 
during the early 1980s. 
Philippine export performance is highly mixed. Nontraditional man- 
ufactures exports grew rapidly, and increased their share of  total ex- 
ports from 6 percent in  1970 to 60 percent by  1980. But the overall 
growth of  exports was insufficient  given the high  investment, high 
foreign-borrowing  strategy the country pursued. The share of  mer- 
chandise exports in GDP was nearly the same at the end of the decade 
as it was at the beginning (table 8.7.) This was in sharp contrast to 
neighboring countries, where significant increases in exports took place. 
Furthermore, the export/GDP share overstates the Philippine posi- 
tion. The very rapid growth of nontraditional exports shifted the struc- 
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Table 8.7  Export Shares in GDP 
1970  1974  1976  1978  1980  1982  1984 
Percentage shares merchandise exports to GDP 
Philippines  15.1  18.6  14.2  14.2  16.4  12.6  16.7 
Malaysia  41.3  43.8  47.5  46.7  54.0  44.6  48.3 
Thailand  10.5  18.1  17.9  17.5  19.3  18.6  20.2 
Philippines memo items 
Exports net of  15.1  17.7  12.6  12.4  14.0  10.3  12.5 
consignment imports 
Service exportsa  2.6  3.5  3.0  4.6  4.7  5.9  6.3 
Sources: Philippines: Central Bank, Annual report: Statistical bulletin, 1985, table 6.55. 
and unpublished balance-of-payments data. Others: Asian Development Bank, Key fn- 
dicators of Developing Member Countries, 1986. 
“Net of interest receipts and U.S.  base rental. 
and lower domestic value added. The result was to increase the import 
component of the country’s exports, lowering the net foreign exchange 
generation of the traded goods sector. A rough correction for this effect 
is shown in table 8.7 where consignment imports for the garment and 
semiconductor industries  are netted out of  Philippine  exports. The 
result is a narrowing export/GDP ratio over the decade.” 
The structure of protection bears much of the responsibility for the 
slow rate of output growth and low returns on investment described 
above, as well as the insufficient growth of exports. Despite the rapid 
growth of labor-intensive exports, Philippine manufacturing remained 
capital intensive, with low productivity growth and  low employment 
generation.I6 What the Philippines did in the 1970s, through investment 
incentives  and import protection, amounted in fact to a  strategy of 
secondary import substitution  concentrating on intermediate goods. 
This strategy saw  some success, particularly  under the impetus of 
increased  domestic investment and  construction, but  by  1978  had 
reached its zenith.  The manufacturing growth rate declined continu- 
ously starting in that year, and the industries promoted in the 1970s 
suffered huge output declines in the 1980s (table 8.8). 
The major break in trade policy came in 1981, when the Philippines 
started an import decontrol and tariff reduction program under a World 
Bank Structural Adjustment Loan. This came at a time when what the 
Philippines desperately needed was a substantial devaluation and ex- 
penditure  reduction. The program  was  soon  superceded by  import 
controls adopted during the crisis in 1983, although it reduced revenue 
collections, and probably increased the output declines that took place 
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Table 8.8  Real GDP by Industrial Origin (percentage change) 
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8.4.4  The Martial Law Business Environment: “Crony Capitalism” 
The last contributor to the debt crisis in the Philippines was a more 
general change in the business environment that occurred under martial 
law. The change had its roots in the Philippine  political system, and 
the challenge that martial law presented. 
Politics in the Philippines has traditionally been dominated by a group 
of wealthy families, who exercised political control in local areas and 
competed among themselves for the presidency. Although from a well- 
to-do family, Marcos was not really of  this group. When Marcos de- 
clared martial law in  1972, suspended the Constitution, and dissolved 
Congress, he put himself directly in opposition to the traditional oli- 
garchs. In order to  solidify the position of the martial law regime Marcos 184  Robert S. DohnedPonciano Intal, Jr. 
did two things. The first was to centralize political power and govern- 
ment functions in the national government in Manila, and greatly ex- 
pand the national government and military role. The second response 
was to create a countervailing elite: his own family, his wife’s, and a 
group of Marcos associates, or, as they were called, cronies. 
To  do so, Marcos used the power of the state to dispense and ac- 
cumulate wealth.  Public works contracts, government procurement, 
industrial incentives, and inexpensive credit were all channeled to Mar- 
cos supporters, including the military, to cement loyalty, and through 
kickbacks, to enrich Marcos himself. None of this, except the inclusion 
of the military, was unusual in Philippine politics; “What are we here 
for?” asked one former Philippine  president  when questioned  about 
graft in his administration.  What was unusual was the scale on which 
this took place under martial law. This was made possible by the greatly 
expanded level of public investment in the 1970s, financed by foreign 
borrowing. It was also supported by the preference of external creditors 
for public guarantees, which further concentrated the flow of financial 
resources through the state. 
But Marcos’s use of state power went beyond simple graft. The most 
important part of the wealth accumulation was done through the cre- 
ation of monopolies,  either through direct intervention  to control an 
industry, or through the grant of exemptions or exclusive privileges to 
favored individuals. The government intervened directly in food mar- 
keting, the fertilizer industry, labor export, gambling, and, through the 
Cultural Center of the Philippines, in  pornographic film distribution. 
Monopolies were created in the two most important export crops, sugar 
and coconuts. Run by two Marcos cronies, these generated billions of 
pesos of revenue. In addition, presidential decrees gave tariff and tax 
exemptions or exclusive import rights to particular firms, granting ef- 
fective monopolies. Among the industries affected were livestock and 
television  imports, peroxide,  sugar milling equipment, and cigarette 
filter production. 
Outright expropriation was done only at the outset of martial law. 
Later, less visible pressure was brought to bear on profitable firms to 
sell out to Marcos family members, or to cronies. The cronies built 
business empires, based on very high financial leveraging. They were 
willing to take large financial risks due to their implicit government 
backing,  an assumption that proved correct in the  1980s  when  the 
government rescued many crony firms. 
These actions took a significant toll on the behavior of the private 
sector not associated with the Marcos government. Businessmen be- 
came less willing to invest and expand in the Philippines for fear of 
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try. In order to protect themselves from the cronies and from their own 
government, firms invited foreign  joint venture participation, reasoning 
that Marcos or  his associates would be reluctant to move against a firm 
with foreign ownership. Political opposition among the business class 
began to surface in 1980, grew after the corporate bailouts of 1981, and 
became widespread after the Aquino assassination. 
By  the end of the  1970s, corruption in  the Philippines  was large 
enough to have macroeconomic consequences. The effects went be- 
yond  the drain  of funds through  corruption. Increasing government 
interventions, monopolization, and grants of exclusive privilege sapped 
the efficiency of the economy, lowered the profitability of investments 
that were undertaken, and increased the vulnerability of the Philippines 
to the financial crises of the early  1980s. Crony capitalism provides 
much of the explanation for the deterioration of economic growth and 
asset portfolios in the 1980s, and was the first thing that the new Aquino 
government sought to diminish. 
Power and wealth were mixed motives for Marcos’s actions from 
the beginning. Furthermore, there were some successes of the martial 
law administration; not all of its actions can be characterized as  plunder 
and theft. But, in the latter part of the 1970s the balance began to tilt, 
and the accumulation of wealth became the predominant motive. And 
this in turn severely limited the willingness and ability of the govern- 
ment to react to the approaching economic crisis. 
8.4.5  Crisis and Adjustment 
The Marcos government  first tried to counter  the domestic recession, 
but it came under increasing pressure from its external creditors, in- 
cluding the IMF and World Bank, from its own statutory limitation on 
external debt, and from its increasing difficulty in generating counter- 
part funds to match foreign project inflows. The Philippines changed 
its policy course during 1982, cutting national government expenditure 
and dramatically slowing the growth of the money supply. But by this 
time the drain on reserves and the drying up of short-term capital had 
already  begun, and the moratorium, finally  declared on  15  October 
1983, had become inevitable. 
Three things had a critical effect on the adjustment period that fol- 
lowed. First, the Philippines had almost exhausted its foreign exchange 
reserves when the moratorium was declared. The severe liquidity con- 
straint  decisively influenced  the trade and exchange rate policy  the 
country adopted during the crisis. The second factor was a massive 
increase in base money that occurred in the last half of  1983, which 
largely accommodated the devaluations  that took place in June and 
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percent. The final factor was the almost complete dissembling of the 
portfolios of the state-owned financial institutions. By 1984 and 1985, 
government aid to  these institutions absorbed almost 2 percent of GNP. 
Under pressure from the severe shortage of foreign exchange, the 
Philippine government reverted to trade and exchange rate policy which 
had characterized much of the postwar period.  Banks were required 
to surrender foreign exchange holdings to the Central Bank, which in 
turn allocated the supply to priority uses. Taxes on traditional exports 
were raised, and the fall in their export volume continued. The gov- 
ernment effectively created a multiple exchange rate system by allow- 
ing  importers to obtain  foreign  currency on the black  market. This 
greatly increased the import premium, and meant a continuing shortage 
of foreign exchange at the Central Bank, even for priority allocations. 
Non-traditional manufactures exports increased, but not by enough to 
prevent an overall decline  in  export volumes.  The current account 
deficit was reduced, but this was brought about by a dramatic fall in 
imports, particularly capital goods imports. 
Under IMF pressure, the Philippines devalued further in  1984, re- 
duced export taxes, and abandoned the exchange surrender require- 
ment, unifying the exchange rate. But the Fund was further concerned 
with inflation, and the huge growth in the money supply that had taken 
place. In a highly unusual step, the IMF demanded a reduction in the 
level of the money supply as a precondition for an agreement, and the 
program that the Philippines and the Fund finally agreed on had strin- 
gent monetary growth restrictions. The Central Bank met the precon- 
dition, and met most of  the monetary targets, primarily  through the 
sale of Central Bank bills, with interest rates at times over 40 percent. 
Evaluating monetary policy during this period is difficult. Reported 
interest rates lagged behind the inflation rate, so that real interest rates 
only turned positive in  1985. However, the real money supply fell by 
30 percent during 1984, to the lowest level of the decade. In addition, 
there was a decisive shift of what bank credit there was to the public 
sector; real credit to the private sector fell by 49 percent between 1983 
and 1985. 
The program was highly successful at meeting the external targets 
and in  reducing the rate of  inflation.  The Philippines  eliminated all 
payments arrears by the end of 1985, and had virtually eliminated the 
current account deficit.  The noninterest current account balance in- 
creased by nearly 10 percent of GNP  in a three-year period (table 8.9). 
The inflation rate fell as rapidly as it had risen. Although six-month 
changes in the CPI remained at rates above 50 percent for all of 1984, 
by May 1985 the inflation rate was below 10 percent per year. For all 
of 1985 (December-December)  the rate was below 6 percent, the lowest 
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Table 8.9  Philippine Noninterest Current Account ($ million) 
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Balance  -  1575  ~  1139  74  I  I875  1892 
% of GNP  -4.0  -3.3  2.4  5.9  6.4 
Source: Philippine Central Bank. 
The output cost of the stabilization was high. Per capita incomes fell 
by  15 percent from 1983 to 1985, with a further 3 percent fall in 1986. 
Total investment expenditure fell by  50 percent.  The manufacturing 
sector was particularly hard hit, with the largest losses posted by the 
industries that had been protected during the 1970s (see table 8.8). The 
credit squeeze had a drastic effect, forcing many firms to the wall. It 
was this reduction of output and the attendant compression of imports 
that was responsible for achieving external balance so quickly. Over 
the course of  the program there was little change in the balance  of 
incentives for traded goods, and a 4 percent reduction in the volume 
of exports. 
A substantial output cost was also paid for reducing inflation so quickly, 
and the emphasis in the IMF program on reducing monetary growth ap- 
pears misplaced. Reducing inflation in the Philippines has never been as 
difficult as in many Latin American countries, for the Philippines lacks 
the institutional features that give inflation momentum. Unionization is 
very low, and indexation virtually absent. The Philippines has repeat- 
edly exhibited substantial real wage declines after devaluations and the 
same occurred between  1983 and 1986. But the credit stringency that 
was imposed by the monetary policy, and the shift in credit towards the 
public sector to support the losses of the two state banks, had a severe 
effect on domestic business and financial institutions. The Philippines 
has been traumatized by six years of financial upheaval, and it will take 
some time to restore confidence. 
Despite the high output cost, the Philippines did achieve a successful 
and rapid stabilization between 1983 and 1985, and the new government 
started with the considerable advantage that those stabilization costs 
had  already  been  paid.  Arguably, the program  was  instrumental in 
bringing about the change in  government, and the end to the abuses 
of the crony period. And yet, stabilization has not been the real problem 
for the Philippines; the Philippine economy is relatively easy to sta- 
bilize. It is the achievement of  sustained economic growth that has 
proved more elusive, and the problems here are more microeconomic 
and resource allocational than they are macroeconomic in nature. 
In the end, the Philippine debt crisis is largely a microeconomic story. 
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the problems  of a  sluggish  and overprotected manufacturing  sector, 
increasing  taxation  of  agricultural  exports, and the vitiation  of  the 
domestic economy through cronyism. It is true that the second oil shock 
and the following interest rate shock accelerated the Philippine crisis. 
In addition, Philippine policymakers made their own problems worse 
by failing to respond to the external shock, by betting heavily against 
devaluation through the issuance of swap and forward contracts, and 
by waiting so long to declare a moratorium. But the fundamental dif- 
ficulties would not have been avoided through a more favorable external 
environment or  better short-run macro management. By failing to  make 
fundamental resource allocation adjustments when external financing 
was available, the Philippines made its problems far more difficult in 
the 1980s. 
8.5  The Aquino Government 
The popular revulsion against the excesses of the Marcos adminis- 
tration  has placed the Aquino government in a unique position. The 
new government has dismantled the monopolies in coconuts and sugar, 
and has committed itself to less market interference and equal appli- 
cation of the law. While it is unrealistic to suppose that corruption will 
disappear from Philippine  political  life,  it  is  likely  to be  drastically 
reduced in scale; Mrs. Aquino has already dismissed two cabinet mem- 
bers for graft, despite their close association with her husband. The 
government has also enacted a comprehensive tax reform that reduces 
exceptions and will increase the responsiveness of the tax system. 
The Aquino government faces the problem that has plagued the Phil- 
ippines since independence: how to achieve self-sustaining output, wage, 
and employment growth. The new government has continued the trade 
liberalization program that was interrupted by the debt crisis, although 
against heavy domestic opposition. And it has encouraged activity in 
the rural sector and reduced the discrimination against traditional ex- 
port goods. 
But the world economy is far less hospitable than it was in the 1960s 
and 1970s, and the debt accumulation and array of nonperforming assets 
are a heavy burden of the past. Economic recovery and growth in the 
Philippines will require a high degree of political determination, as  well 
as a fraction of the external funds that were available to  build the martial 
law regime. Appendix 
Table 8.10  Real GNP by  Expenditure Shares and by  Industrial Origin (percentage changes) 
1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
Personal consumption 
Government consumption 
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Notes 
I. This does not cover capital flight through export underinvoicing or import 
overinvoicing, which has also characterized the Philippines. 
2. In contrast to other countries in this study, exports of services make up 
a significant part (one-third) of total Philippine exports. These include not only 
the rental on U.S. military bases, but also the supply of overseas workers, and 
construction services as well.  Dollar earnings from exports of goods and ser- 
vices stayed roughly constant from 1980 to 1984. 
3. Short-term debt was not covered in IMF programs, nor were revolving 
credits (the vast majority of short-term  debt) included in the Philippine statutory 
debt limitation. 
4. In a swap arrangement a bank would borrow abroad in foreign currency, 
and then exchange the proceeds with the Central Bank for pesos. The Central 
Bank agreed to sell foreign currency to the bank at a set exchange rate in the 
future, so the bank could pay back the loan. 
5. This was unknown at the time, for the Central Bank was systematically 
overstating its reserves, by amounts of as much as a billion dollars. 
6. Throughout, we measure terms of trade effects as  the amount of additional 
exports needed to maintain an import level. Import prices rose 28.7 percent 
relative to export prices. This, times an import share in GNP  of 15.0 percent, 
equals 4.3 percent. The terms of trade income loss in this case excludes the 
transitory income gain of  1973 and 1974. 
7. The starting point for the terms of trade calculation was the year 1978. 
Between 1978 and 1982 import prices rose 33.1 percent relative to Philippine 
export prices; this times the 1979 import share of GNP  of 20.8 percent equals 
6.89 percent. The average interest rate paid on Philippine external debt rose 
from 5.21 percent in 1979 to 8.73 percent in 1982. Rates of export price inflation 
used to calculate the real interest rate were 5.20 percent (the 1975-79  average) 
and -2.96  percent (the 1979-85  average). The change in the real interest rate 
was multiplied by the share of gross external debt, less foreign assets of the 
monetary system, in the average  1979-80  GNP. These types of calculations 
are highly sensitive to the endpoints. The endpoints were chosen as reasonable 
approximations,  and produce neither the highest nor the lowest income changes 
possible. 
8. Net exports added a negative 3 percent to the GDP increment over the 
same period. 
9. There is some  question  about the true level of capital formation and savings 
in the Philippines, in part engendered by the low resultant growth rate. Studies 
of the World Bank’s International Comparisons Project indicate a significantly 
lower value for the Philippine investment share. 
10. Richard Hooley (1985) has estimated a decline in total factor productivity 
of Philippine manufacturing of 2 percent per year in the latter half of the 1970s. 
Factor productivity improved within most industries, but interindustry shifts 
were responsible for the overall decline. 
11. A particularly egregious example is the Bataan nuclear power plant, built 
by Westinghouse, at a cost three times that of a similar plant built by West- 
inghouse in Pusan, Korea. 
12. A rise in government revenue was a major goal of the IMF’s Extended 
Finance Facility for the Philippines (1976-79).  A revenue share of 17 percent 
was also part of the Philippines’ 1974-77  Development Plan. 191  Debt Crisis and Adjustment in the Philippines 
13. The Philippines had what amounted to a de facto real peg against the 
dollar until  1983, riding the dollar down in  1978 and then up between 1980 and 
1982. 
14. Two further developments affected the supply of  traditional exports. 
Conservation  legislation reduced the legal exports of logs, which had accounted 
for 27 percent of exports in  1970, to near zero by the end of the decade, and 
the suspension  of U.S. sugar quotas in 1974 deprived the Philippines of a highly 
lucrative market. The increasing taxation of export agriculture was to some 
degree offset by substantial investments in irrigation for domestic grain, and 
the Philippines briefly became a rice exporter during the 1970s. 
IS. One area where the Philippines  did have considerable export success 
was in the service sector. Philippine overseas construction and contract labor 
services  grew substantially during the decade, boosting the service export share 
from 2.5 to 6 percent of GDP.  Ironically, this is an indication that Philippine 
factors of  production,  particularly  labor, were more  productive  outside the 
country than within. 
16. The peak share of manufacturing in employment was reached in  1956. 
17. A major source of the monetary expansion was losses that the Central 
Bank suffered on a large volume of outstanding forward contracts and swap 
agreements. These had been issued as a form of patronage, and as a way of 
borrowing reserves. 
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